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After a winter of increasingly hysterical press coverage of the risk of a human pandemic, Britain at last experienced the reality of bird flu when, at the end of March 2006, a single dead swan washed up on to the beach at Cellardyke on the east coast of Scotland. The bird tested positive for the type of the virus designated H5N1, present in many bird populations and which had led to dozens of human fatalities across Asia. It was with almost palpable relief that the U.K.'s Daily Telegraph newspaper was able to declare on its front page "Britain's first bird flu zone," complete with a map showing a "1,000 square mile area at risk." Like Chekhov's seagull or Ibsen's wild duck, the bird was surely an omen: the next autumn migration season would bring squadrons of sickly foreign birds plummeting from the skies to spread their deadly infection to anything and anyone within range. Several years on, we are still waiting. Hong Kong beginnings The story of bird flu as a real hazard to human health began in 1997 in Hong Kong, where eighteen people were infected and six died after coming into close contact with birds at the city's live markets. The outbreak took epidemiologists – the scientists who study the spread of diseases – by surprise as it had been thought that the virus could not jump from birds to humans without the help of an intermediary species such as pigs. Despite the unpreparedness, further spread of the disease and loss of life was prevented by the rapid cull of all poultry in the city. In 2003, the H5N1 virus resurfaced - now slightly altered and more dangerous, some commentators likened it to the doomsday bug in Michael Crichton's old thriller, The Andromeda Strain. This time several members of a Chinese family died after having visited relatives who kept chickens. Similar cases began to be reported from Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia, and the World Health Organization (WHO) announced a pandemic alert. Through the autumn and winter of 2005, human cases spread westward, recorded with mounting agitation by the European press. Russia, Kazakhstan, Kurdistan and Turkey were hit in turn, as the European Union banned the import of live birds and feathers. All the human casualties were found to have been in close proximity to birds – five Azerbaijani teenagers died after plucking a dead swan. Readers' comments |
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Dangerous Journalism
This article "Bid Flu: A Dead Duck?" makes several points that lack proper evidence and, as presented as fact, prove dangerous journalism for anyone considering preparation for this disaster scientific experts deem as inevitable.
"The SARS episode now provides an exemplary case study of how a powerful virus spreads – and may be contained. For although SARS did rapidly kill three times as many people as avian flu has done, it was contained relatively efficiently by isolation and quarantine of those infected."
This article fails to note that SARS is not flu. SARS has 10 day incubation period where the victim cannot shed virus. Inversely, influenza only incubates for 3 days before showing symptoms. Worse, the virus can be spread before the end of the incubation period (without any visible symptoms). For this reason, planning for a severe flu pandemic must be vigilant not to rely on overconfidence from past successes.
"There are other reasons to worry less about bird flu. The media has repeatedly said that a pandemic is 'overdue' or even 'long overdue'. This claim is not based on any virological dictum, but simply on the historical pattern of outbreaks – one every 10 to 15 years or so from 1918 to 1977 and then a pregnant pause until now. But in fact the longer H5N1 'tries', the less likely it is to succeed in adapting into a human-transmissible type.
Some scientists now believe H5N1 has had its chance. A virus is not like a volcano, where pressure may build up gradually, leading to an eventual eruption. And a continued non-outbreak doesn't make a future outbreak more likely or more deadly. "
It would be helpful to readers to hear the scientific basis of this argument. Because non of the "experts" referred to earlier in the article as calling a flu pandemic "inevitable" have EVER said that "the longer H5N1 'tries', the less likely it is to succeed in adapting". This shows no understanding of viral mutation and even less respect for the journalistic obligation to inform the public truthfully about pressing current events.
I apologize if this seems harsh, but the duty of journalists to report earnestly on this issue is far too often pushed aside for soothing accusations of scaremongering against the international medical community and others who work to prepare our world for an inevitable public health emergency.
Sincerely,
Justin Kamen
jbk2108@columbia.edu
www.StudentsPrepAmerica.org
H5N1 -prepare for panflu year
This article seems to overlook both the facts that the individual cases, and, human clusters are being fought, (on more than one continent) however sloppily, at great expense, (including animal cull zones, movement restrictions, biohazard Level 3 PPE, and, major donations of Tamiflu - seemingly the only treatment keeping H5N1 from being 100% fatal, and, only if given rapidly at, or, for close contacts, before symptom onset, at higher/longer doses than for seasonal flu, because H5N1 replicates so fast and is so virulent) and, that nations are more and more turning to hiding their cases, in order to not increase those "official" statistics (and to avoid economic or travel consequences of reporting an outbreak)(especially in this Olympic year).
Indonesia, for instance, has been claiming people must test positive three times before being an "officially confirmed" H5N1 case; if they don't get Tamiflu in time, people die - but if they are on Tamiflu for about 3 days, it confuses the test, and people who tested positive on arrival but negative after treatment aren't added to the numbers. (There may also be pressure to report cases/deaths as other diseases with symptoms similar to H5N1.)
Many nations have figured out it is easy to not find anything by not looking for it, or, by doing the wrong test at the wrong time.
(What sorts of things get labelled "state secrets" when they have the "economic and political" consequences an H5N1 confirmation does?)
Remind readers to read the Individual's page under the plans/preparedness sidebar on the US pandemicflu.gov site that's been up since Oct 2005. Search out the "US State Dept H5N1 factsheet" that has said, since July 2006, that travellers should know they risk being stranded (by international or local movement restrictions, put in place by other nations, or, the US itself,) when pandemic breaks out anywhere, and, that the US embassies will not be providing any aid to citizens in the event of pandemic.
"Outsourcing" of essentials has created a huge national security risk, as Dr.Osterholm tried to bring to Congress' attention.
As Dr.Nabarro of the UN said, systems of trade, finance, and workplaces are interconnected, "and will not survive" the impact of pandemic on workforces.
We were all supposed to be making workable local preparations, since 2006, with every community having a Pandemic Preparedness Coordinating Committee, including "all" stakeholders in the process!
H5N1, like HIV, is not going away.
It is on so many continents, in so many bird and mammal species, it will keep mutating, and, swapping with other flu virii.
Each human H5N1 case they only know isn't pandemic start after they apply containment measures and see cases don't continue to appear.
We've already had our months of warning; once you know for sure pandemic has started, preparation time will have ended.
Take care of yourself; the state pandemic flu summits with HHS back in 2006 have not resulted in the feds/state/nor locals making any provision for you during a year or more of infrastructure disruptions, and something deadly and contagious before symptoms.
It is not true, as too many officials have said in private; "we can't tell the public, because there is nothing they can do".
For Community Pandemic Mitigation to be possible we need to be proactive, and use the warning science has given us, and, the time Tamiflu has bought us.
See GetPandemicReady.org and try not to be part of the problem.
We'd finally be better prepared for all other disasters and emergencies (which will still occur during panflu year, with far less aid possible) by trying to be better prepared for pandemic year disruptions.
The people back in 1918 were better prepared at home than the public is today. Let's go back as a society to valuing family preparedness.